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Abstract 
 
To control and price negative externalities in passenger road transport, we develop an 
innovative computational agent based economics (ACE) model to simulate a market 
oriented “‘cap”’ and trade system. The ACE model provides an integrated framework 
with the following steps that can be used for most road network systems.   
(i) The computational assessment of a digitized road network model of the real world 
congestion hot spot determines the “‘cap”’ of the system in terms of vehicle volumes  
when at which traffic efficiency deteriorates and the environmental externalities take 
off exponentially. (ii)  Road users have to submit bids with the market clearing price 
at the fixed “‘cap”’ supply of travel slots in a given time slice (peak hour) being 
determined by a sealed bid uniform price Dutch auction conducted  electronically. 
Herein lies the smart market format for passenger road transport (SMPRT) 
congestion.  (iii) The cross-sectional demand data on car users who traverse the 
cordon area is used to model and calibrate the heterogeneous bid submission 
behaviour behaviour in order to understand the consequences of road user charging in 
terms of price demand elasticities.  (iv) This willingness to pay approach is contrasted 
with the generalized  cost approach to pricing congestion where the value of travel 
time is assumed to be homogeneous for all road users.   
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1. Introduction  
Agent based Computational Economics (ACE) and its pragmatic arm of 
computational mechanism design which involves human experimental input and 
computational “‘wind tunnel testing”’ (see, Friedman and Sunder (1994), Roth 
(2002), Dash et. al. (2003),  Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore (2004), Arifovic and 
Ledyard,  this issue, (2006), Markose and Sunder, (20067)) is a fast growing new 
subfield of eEconomics and cComputer sScience. It has alsois also becomeing the 
norm for the design of institutions. Economic agents are effectively computer 
programs representing decisions rules for behaviour within an artificial environment.  
Agents can have varying degrees of computational intelligence and autonomy to learn 
and adapt to their environment.  Likewise, the environment can be represented in a 
stylized way or in terms of what has been called “‘model verité”’ viz. with the full 
capacity to represent real time data, (Markose and Sunder (, (20076). Economic agent 
modelling is increasingly being used to “‘wind tunnel”’ test market protocols and 
their variants in advance of implementation. It is useful to know if the proposed 
design will achieve intended outcomes or bring about unintended consequences that 
are socially undesirable.  The latter are arise directly through poor design of protocols 
or indirectly through strategic behaviour permitted or even encouraged (inadvertently) 
by the protocols.  Agent based models have been used to understand the properties of 
auction design (Andreoni and Miller (1995), Koesrindartoto (2004)) and more 
recently they have been used for real world design applications as insuch as the 
reforming of the electricity markets (Bower and Bunn (2001), Bunn and Oliveira 
(2001), Koesrindartoto and Testfatsion (2004)). 
Traditional modelling for policy design uses econometric or analytical 
methods.  Econometric methods run into what is knownreferred to as the Lucas 
cCritique that arises from the lack of structural invariance as agents game the system 
(see, Markose, 2005).  In other words, the estimated parameters of behavioural 
equations are no longer valid after the change of policy rules.  Further, analytical 
methods use simplifying assumptions for tractability and cannot in many cases give 
“‘ball park”’ figures for the actual responsiveness of the system. 
In this paper, to control and price negative externalities in passenger road 
transport, we develop an innovative ACE model to simulate a market oriented “‘cap”’ 
and trade system.  The ACE model provides an integrated framework that can be used 
for most road network systems.  The core of the design is a Smart Market which 
elicits valuations from potential road users through an on-line bid submission process 
with a Dutch aAuction protocol to determine the market clearing price and the 
determination of winners and losers,.  hHence, the acronym of SMPRT which stands 
for Smart Market for Passenger Road Transport. The smart market concept with the 
use of a bid submission process that signals willingness to pay for immediacy or 
priority of service in the context of Internet congestion was first suggested by Mackie-
Mason and Varian (1995).11     The approach based on the willingness to pay which 
reveals road users’ different valuations of travel time marks a departure  from the 
                                                 
1
 McCabe et. al.(1991) discuss how  smart computer-assisted markets involves online aggregation of 
decentralized information such as on the preferences, valuations, capacity and budget constraints of 
potential users or suppliers of a resource  with a centralized market/auction protocol or algorithm that 
determines prices and allocations.  The design behind a smart market is critical for it to work 
effectively as a coordination device and  to solve resource allocation problems in specific cases with  
complex features such as, in this case, of the pricing and control of  negative externalities from an 
economic activity.    
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traditional generalized cost approach to congestion externality (see, Walters (1961), 
Vickrey (1969)) which assumes a  homogenous value for travel time.    
The recent introduction in California of the dynamic and ambient congestion 
pricing2 of “‘Express”’ lanes of certain commuter interstate routes at peak times  
improvess  the welfare of those with higher valuations of travel time.  They seek to 
avoid congestion on the free lanes and enhance predictability in travel time by paying 
the toll3 (see, Small et. al. (2005), and Brownstone et. al., (2002)).  This approach 
works when there are alternative non-priced roads for travel for the relevant origin-
destinations.4  Further, in this design of road pricing, there is no concern about 
maintaining overall efficient use of fixed road capacity and hence there is no analysis 
on whether the price charged on the Express lanes is sufficient to cover the road user 
externality costs in both the priced and non-priced lanes.  As there is no evidence of a 
reduction in the number orf road users on the route, this may indeed be unlikely to be 
the case.  
The “‘cap”’ and trade approach used in our design of SMPRT is inspired by 
the principle of assigning property rights to the “‘bads”’ of economic activity as a 
means of controlling negative externalities.   A landmark application of  the latter 
arose with the Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments in the U.S.5 which 
aimed at reducing sulphur dioxide (S02) emissions from coal and oil fired electricity 
generating plants  (see, Schmalensee et. al. ,( 1998), Joaskow et. al. (1998)). 
Significant to this framework, as opposed to traditional command and control 
methods where a plethora of prescriptive engineering and performance standards on 
the abatement technology is imposed at the level of the individual polluter, is the shift 
of focus to the total  acceptable amount of the negative factor from the economic 
activity at a collective level.  While often as in pollution control, the “‘cap”’ is 
determined by some grandfathering principle -,  in our model of road user charging, 
the “‘cap”’ refers to thethe efficient volume of traffic  optimal level of congestion 
wwhich determines the fixed supply of travel slots, denoted by X# , in a given time 
slice (8am -9am week- day morning peak hour) on a cordon area of a road network 
identified as a congestion “‘hotspot”’.   Theis efficient volume of traffic optimal level 
of congestion  is determined by a state of the art road traffic micro-simulator whereby 
the so called production function of traffic with total distance travelled by all vehicles 
demanding service, taken as the total  positive “‘output”’ of the system, begins to drop 
with incremental growth in vehicle volumes. This is taken as a measure of how the 
social benefits from travel fall as when many who may have successfully traversed 
the cordon area in the hourwithin a given time, can no longer do so due to the 
gridlock.  This is also the point at which the environmental externalities from 
                                                 
2
 The prices adjust typically every 6 minutes to maintain traffic at free flow levels which involves a 
density of less than 27 vehicles per lane per mile.  The fee is posted upstream from the entrance to the 
lanes and road users decide ‘on the ‘spot’ whether to pay to use the Express lanes or to use the non-
tolled lanes.   
3
 Tolls are collected on a per trip basis electronically by a system called Fast Trak which requires users 
of tolled roads to subscribe to. 
4
 Sheri Markose is grateful to Frank Kelly for bringing this to her attention. 
5The proposed target of  sulphur dioxide (S02) emissions from coal  and oil fired electricity generating 
plants was a  10 -million- ton per - year reduction  (totalling about 50% )reduction from 1980 
emissions levels to be achieved by the year 2000 and starting in 1995.  Annually oOwners of existing 
affected units were given  fixed numbers of tradable permits each year. These were called “allowances” 
with and  the allocative rules governing their allocation depended ing primarily on historic emissions 
genereation and fuel use and newuse. New entrants to the industry must would be obliged to  buy 
needed their allowances from existing units or at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) auctions.   
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vehicular emissions were found to take off exponentially.  Thus,  while 
adoptingalthough we adopt a ‘”cap”’ and trade approach used in pollution control, it 
is important to note that there is a crucial difference between a fully tradable system 
of permits for negative externalities abatement and the bid- only market for fixed 
slots.  In the first, all participants are incentivized given an incentive not merely to 
seek out cheaper alternatives but also to use revenues received from sales to make 
necessary abatement investments. A large part of the auction design in the case of 
pollution permits is geared toward achieving that objective.  In the bid- only system 
for travel slots, the revenues are collected solely by a transport authority and the latter 
alone has access to funds to make the technological improvements for abatement of 
the externality. In keeping with the rationale of the “‘cap”’ and trade approach, it is 
critical that revenues collected incentivize a new wave of technological innovation for 
low impact transport modalities.  Indeed, the prescription of the ‘cap’, beyond which 
congestion reduction is not necessary, is a useful device to prevent monopoly pricing 
that could follow from the bid- only framework of road user charging. 
The SMPRT simulator was applied to price congestion in a real world city 
centre congestion ‘hot spot’ in the cCentral Gateshead in the U.K..    Extensive data 
analysis was done by Peter Allen to identify the heterogeneous demand characteristics 
that correspond to actual income, demographic and socio-economic classes of the 
commuters that who traverse the cordon area.   Thus, the simulation of the bid 
submission process by road users was done in a fully disaggregated way based on this 
demand analysis.   The  results of the agent based SMPRT simulations of the 
heterogeneous bid submission process of the actual road users has have been very 
illuminating and yields new insights for issues regarding the willingness to pay and 
the value of travel time.  The application of a uniform price auctioning rather than a 
discriminatory pricingone is related to the need to determine unique market clearing 
prices and an inverse price function.6  The heterogeneous value of time is determined 
by the marginal road users who respectively clear the market at different levels of 
biddable travel slots.7   This can be contrasted with the econometric panel data 
analyses based on reported and stated preference for value of travel time that have 
been used in the case of the dynamic congestion pricing in Express lanes in California  
(Small et. al. (2005), and Brownstone et. al. (2002)).  Compared to the traditional 
generalized cost function models for road use, the auction based approach enables the 
experimenter to the probe the system for demand elasticities with respect to the road 
user price both on an aggregate and cross sectional basis across different socio-
economic classes.  Indeed, as will be discussed later, in the generalized cost approach 
to congestion charging, the aggregate demand elasticity is not integral to the model 
and has to be obtained in an ad hoc way.  Further, the identification of the winners 
and losers, in the agent based SMPRT framework, can be linked to the home-work 
spatial locations of the region tofor simulateions on the longer term implications of 
road user charging and for the more efficient provision of public transport.8   
                                                 
6
 At the levels of excess demand currently present and forecasted to persist in the medium term future, 
our robustness analysis shows that the uniform price auction generates more revenues than the 
discriminatory auction (see, Markose et. al. (2006) and Koesrindartoto (2004)). 
7
 At the levels of excess demand currently present and forecasted to exist persist in the medium term 
future, our robustness analysis shows that the uniform price auction generates more revenues than the 
discriminatory auction (see, Markose et. al. ( 2006) and Koesrindartoto (2004)). 
8
 Allen ( 1997, a,b) has recommended that such ACE models be used for an integrated analysis of 
transport and land use models. 
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  A final important aspect of the empirical implementation of the SMPRT 
simulator is the finding that the simulator can be applied in two distinct ways.  For 
this, it is useful to distinguish between road networks that have a high proportion of 
habitual car users (example, peak time week day city centre traffic) and those with a 
high proportion of road users that vary from one day to the next (for example, the 
M25 London orbital road, especially on weekends and bBank hHolidays etc.).   In 
both cases, the determination of the optimal ‘“cap’” for the road network system is the 
benchmark.  In the case with of habitual road users whose home-to-work place origin 
destination (OD) matrix and demand distributional characteristics is available, this 
data can be used to calibrate the SMPRT simulator to determine the “‘cap”’ related 
price for congestion and environmental externalities.   However, the actual 
implementation of the SMPRT to operate as an opening call market to determine the 
market relevant price for peak time road use may be necessary only in the case of road 
networks where the actual users have demand distributional characteristics that are 
highly variable over time.  Where an actual bid submission process needs to be 
implemented, the mechanism designer has to provide a robustness analysis of the 
feasibility of the auction protocol to deliver the requisite revenue from the bids.  This 
crucially depends on whether agents will bid their true values, an assumption that is 
made in the simulated format of the SMPRT. Again, an ACE approach based on the 
Erev-Roth (1998) reinforcement learning was developed to show how, under 
conditions of strategic bidding, what the critical degree level of demand pressure 
(relative excess demand to the “‘cap”’ supply) is needed for the proposed SMPRT 
protocol to work in practice.  However, due to space constraints, the results from 
these are reported elsewhere, (Markose et. al. (,  (2006).       
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we first give a 
brief introduction to the rationale for pricing road use externalities and some issues 
raised by the London congestion charging experience.  The generalized cost approach 
to pricing congestion externality is given in Section 2.3 followed by the auction based 
approach.  Section 3 outlines the determination of the “‘cap”’ based on the transport 
micro-simulation of cCentral Gateshead.  The congestion costs in time and other 
traffic induced output from the transport simulations are recorded as vehicle volumes 
are scaled up and down from existing demand. Section 4 gives a discussion of the 
demand analysis and the bid submission data for the road users who currently traverse 
the cordon area in morning peak hour of 8-9am.  Section 5 gives the SMPRT inverse 
price function and the estimates for demand, income and speed elasticities.  The 
SMPRT price which equals marginal social cost is found to be less than the price that 
clears the market at the “‘cap”’ determined by the transport simulator.  The 
generalized cost function estimates for congestion externality cost is compared with 
the estimate  given in the case of heterogeneous value of time.  The last Section 6 
gives concluding remarks and indicates future work needed.9       
  
2.  Pricing of rRoad uUse eExternalities : gGeneralized cCost aApproach 
and bBid bBased sSmart mMarket fFor cCongestion pPricing   
 
                                                 
9
 Note, all SMPRT inputs and outputs relating to the clearing prices and winner determination can be 
obtained by running the Smart Market simulator at 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ccfea/research/ACE/ace_research.htm .  See also the Foresight report of 
Markose et. al. (2006). 
 http://www.essex.ac.uk/ccfea/menus/news.htm . 
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2.1 Why cControl and pPrice nNegative eExternalities of r Road uUse? 
 
  The traditional view is that economic development with its ever increasing 
demand for road transport and the consumption of non-renewable energy sources in 
this mode of transport, with their respective consequences of congestion and 
pollution, are but necessary evils that must be collectively borne.  A program of 
economic development that fully prices and internalizes the externality costs that the 
private cost- benefit calculus cannot incorporate, is increasingly being seen as 
essential to prevent the overuse and degradation of resources.  The latter is powerfully 
brought out in Garett Hardin’s classic paper on the “Tragedy of the Commons”, 
(Hardin, (1968), where a decline in social welfare and total output occurs as when 
there is no institution to signal and correct for the negative impact of private 
behaviour on society as a whole. 
 
Congestion, pollution and other environmental negative externalities from 
road transport arise when the volume of traffic exceeds the free flow capacity on of 
the road network and when any additional vehicle causes increased delays to other 
vehicles with a knock on effect of higher environmental costs to society as a whole. 
Road users incur only their private costs and not the full marginal social costs of 
congestion and hence ‘over- use’ occurs as because there is no publicly available 
signal when total social benefits start falling.  The implementation of road pricing 
schemes such as toll cordons to cover such externality costs, rather than to raise 
revenue or to recover costs of road building and maintenance, such as in the case of 
toll cordons, is relatively new.10 Optimal road pricing can be viewed as the 
application of a corrective or Pigouvian tax (Pigou, 1920) that seeks to internalize the 
costs of the negative externality via a marginal social cost principle. However, till 
recently, the negative externalities from road use were notoriously difficult to 
estimate, let alone cost.  Marginal social cost pricing of road use externalities has been 
considered by many to be impractical to determine and implement and when it 
manifests as a spot price applying in a person-place-time specific form, it has been 
criticized on the grounds that road users need to know what to pay before the journey, 
, (Nash and Sansom (,  (2001).11  Further, political constraints are cited for why the 
use of road pricing has failed to materialize except in a limited number of cities, 
despite the growth of traffic congestion.  Nevertheless, the continued and predicted 
growth in the ownership of cars and the use of HGVs for the distribution of goods, 
along with environmental concerns of expanding road capacity has led to innovative 
traffic management and demand mitigation strategies being actively sought by 
governments of many countries and especially in the U.K. 
 
2.2 Some iIssues on with London cCongestion cCharging 
                                                 
10
 In the U.K., the Ministry of Transport Smeed Report of 1964 first proposed the idea of pricing roads 
as a function of congestion costs.   
11
 The ADEPT (Automatic Debiting and Electronic Payment for Transport ) project, which conducted a 
field study in Cambridge over the a  period of  three years from October 1992, is such an example of 
spot pricing  (Blythe, 1993, and Blythe and Hills, 1994).  By all accounts, the field study signalled the 
feasibility of the technology involved in monitoring and charging traffic in a radially configured 
cityscape with a fixed (18) number of entry points.  The ADEPT scheme relied on an on-board device 
that was electronically activated and deactivating deactivated on entry and exit from the city limits.  
Once activated, the device connected to the odometer of the vehicle and would charge by debiting from 
a smartcard only during periods in which the speed and distance travelled signalled a state of 
congestion.     
 9
 
 The London congestion charging scheme which was introduced on 17 
February, 2003, involvesd a single charge of £5 on vehicles to drive or park in the 
central London zone from 7am- –6.30 pm.  It is a major example of a successful 
social experiment, in addition to the ones in Singapore and Durham, whereby in that 
the public has complied with a congestion charge.  The London congestion charge 
was recently increased to £8.  However, it is far from the case that the determination 
of the fixed charge, the increase in it and the analysis of the economic implications of 
the charge along a number of relevant dimensions have been based on a set of 
modelling tools that can be tested out or reproduced in a coherent and integrated 
manner.  Shaffer and Santos ( 2003) claim that the estimated fall in the volume of 
vehicles in the Central London zone after the introduction of the charge is has been 
about  15% and that it has resulted in a 21 % increase in speed, thus implying implies 
that the congestion charge of about £5 is about right according to a “‘generalized”’ 
marginal congestion cost calculation done ex post.  The moot point is that the £5 
charge and the increase to £8 were not based on an identifiable notion of efficiency of 
road use in the cordoned area and there is no target optimal volume of “‘passenger car 
units”’ (PCUs, for short).  Note, the latter is a standardized measure for vehicles of 
different sizes.  Hence, apart from noting that there have been improvements in 
congestion in London, there is no means of assessing the extent to which congestion 
abatement is to be pursued.12  Further, while some  estimates of price elasticity of 
aggregate demand are made, there is little scope to gauge the price elasticities of 
demand for the different socio-economic and income groups of road users and hence 
of the impact of the charge on the less well off.   Last but not least, as there has been 
no transparency with regard to the allocative rules governing the revenues raised, the 
public authorities can exploit their monopoly status by raising the congestion charge 
by a large margin in the face of inelastic demand.   
 
2.3 Homogenous opportunity cost of travel time 
 
Typicallyy, all costs from road transport are found to grow inversely with the 
average speed of traffic, and congestion costs arise from increased journey time, T.  
With volume of traffic, X, given in the standardized passenger car units, PCU13, the 
average speed per hour is defined in terms of the average number of kilometres 
travelled, AKT(X).   Then, the average journey time in hours, AT, for the unit 
distance of a kilometre is:  
 
    AT(X) =  )(
1
XAKT
  .                          (1.a) 
 
The total journey time in hours for all X vehicles is   
   
                                                 
12
 Indeed, currently as reported in the Transport for London  (TfL) document (2003, p.46) apart from 
the notion of free flow conditions of traffic, there appears to be  no methodology being used to 
determine the optimal level of congestion.   The TfL document considers that while there is an 
“‘optimal”’ level of congestion, it is too difficult to determine what it is. 
13
 Note, however, we will use terms such as vehicles, commuters or road users interchangeably when 
referring to PCUs.  
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    TT(X) = )(XAKT
X
    .                           (1.b) 
  
The well established concept of congestion externality cost (see, Walters 
(1961), Vickerrey (1969)) follows from the fact that while the individual road user 
only experiences the average  travel time related cost, he is unable to “‘internalize”’ 
the marginal impact on the total journey time of all X road users.  Marginal total 
journey time in hours, MTT,  
 
  MTT =  )1()(
1)(
/ XsXAKTX
XTT
ε+=
∂
∂
.                     (2) 
 
Here ,    
 
                    )(
)(
/ XAKT
X
X
XAKT
Xs ∂
∂
=ε  ,                                                                          
(3) 
 
is the elasticity of speed to volume of traffic.14  Equation (2) implies that for every 
increment in traffic results in Xs /ε times more travel time inflicted on the rest of the 
road users than what is experienced by the added vehicle.  The congestion externality 
in travel time in, hours, is thus: 
 
                       ET =  MTT – AT  =   )(
/
XAKT
Xsε
.                                      (4) 
 
The generalized travel cost approach used in many current calculations of congestion 
charging (see, Newbery (1990), Blake and Santos (2003)) assumes an average cost of 
per a vehicle journey for a unit distance of a kilometre, C(X) .  The so called 
generalized cost function C(X) has two main components15: (i)  a standardized vehicle 
operating cost, VOC,  which  includes costs such as fuel, maintenance, insurance and 
road tax, and (ii) a homogenous value of journey time, VOT, for all commuters.  
Thus, the generalized travel cost function when applied to (1.a) above gives: 
 
                C(X) =  VOC   +   )(XAKT
VOT Dist .                                                     (5) 
 
                                                 
14
 Note the evaluation of elasticity at X when implemented in terms of discrete changes with ∆X>0 is 
given by:   
X
X
XAKT
XAKT
Xs ∆
∆
=
)(
)(
/ε =  .)(
)(
XAKT
X
X
XAKT
∆
∆
   We  ffollow the convention that 
elasticities are given in absolute terms. 
15
 It is also possible to include a third generalized cost, viz. the environmental cost of  road use.  This is 
often included as a generalized unit cost rather than one which is a function of speed or AKT per/ hour.  
In the traffic micro-simulation, the latter was found to be the case, which implies a further environment 
externality cost in addition to the unit cost.  Again, for reasons of space constraints, the analysis 
of environmental costs of road use are is omitted here.  
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Here, Dist is the average trip length. 
With X volume of traffic, the social cost with  SC =  XC(X), yields the 
marginal social cost for congestion externalities, MSCc :  
 
 
                MSCc (X) = 
X
SC
∂
∂
 =  VOC +  )(XAKT
VOT Dist  +  )(XAKT
VOT
xs /ε Dist       .  (6) 
 
      =   C(X) +  )(XAKT
VOT
 xs /ε Dist. 
 
Here xs /ε  is the elasticity defined in (3).   As the marginal social cost, MSCc, is 
greater than the unit cost C(X), the total congestion externality cost , Ec ,  is what 
needs to be added on to the unit C(X) for road users to “‘internalize”’ it and reduce 
traffic.  However, the evaluation of this must be done at the volume of traffic formally 
denoted as X* at whichthe social optimum where the marginal social benefit of travel 
equals the marginal social cost.the inverse demand curve16  intersects with the 
marginal social cost curve.  From (6), the pure congestion externality cost, the Ec 
charge, can be formally given as:  
 
  Ec(X* ) =  MSCc(X*) - C(X* ) = )( *XAKT
VOT
 
x/sε Dist.              (7) 
 
While data on vehicle operating costs can be standardized, the main drawback 
of the generalized cost approach is that as the opportunity cost of time, VOT, is taken 
to be the same for all road users, it has no bearing on how the growing congestion will 
affect demand for road use by commuters with different time costs.  Further, within 
the framework, there is no means of determining the aggregate demand curve for 
travel associated with congestion charging at different traffic volumes X.  In other 
words, all manner of assumptions have to be made to estimate actual price demand 
elasticities (see, Walters (1961), Goodwin ( 1992), Oum ( 1999)) which is crucial 
even for the evaluation of (7).  
 
2.4 Heterogeneous opportunity cost of travel time and willingness to pay 
 
Commuters who traverse the cordon area belong to G different “‘types”’ or 
socio-economic groups with corresponding income distributions.   Let gn  denote the 
total number of commuters of each type g = 1, 2, …… G  and  nig  refers to the ith 
agent in his group with gig nn ........,2,1= .   Note X denotes the total number of 
commuters of all types who travel in a given hour, 
 
                                                 
16
 Indeed, Varian (1993, p.553) has noted that the problem with this Pigouvian tax approach is that we 
need to know the optimal level of the negative externality (viz.,  the optimal level of congestion in this 
case) in order to impose the tax or charge.  Varian goes on to say that if we knew the optimal level of 
say congestion, then we could just control the level of traffic volume “and not have to mess with this 
taxation/charging scheme.”.  In effect, the SMPRT is doing precisely this, ie.,  we control the desired 
volume of traffic and determine the market clearing price and demand curve. 
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                X =  ∑∑
==
ig
ig
n
1n
ig
G
1g
n ,        with   gmg nn ≤ .                                       
(8) 
 
Note, notation involving X,  X#<, X* <X0, will also refer to the rank order of 
the Xth generic commuters such as in the case of all nig with the X highest valuation..   
 
As the bulk of peak time, week  day demand for road use is a derived demand 
from work, the budget for commuting and the value of time is related to commuters’ 
income. Denoting the pro rata daily income and hourly income of the nig road user, 
respectively, as yd(nig) and yh(nig) and assuming that a fixed proportion, α, of daily 
income is spent on commuting to work, the total net private budgetary benefit from 
the trips is given by : 
 
))(
)()((
1 1
Dist
XAKT
ny
VOCny
G
g
n
n
ig
h
ig
d
g
ig
∑∑
= =
−−α  .                      (9) 
 
Thus, with VOC the same as in (5), different user types are distinguished by their the 
size of their travel budgets, αyd(nig), and their travel time valuation.  The value of 
travel time, VOT, or its opportunity cost for each commuter for every unit kilometre, 
is given by the pro rata hourly rate, yh(nig).  The average journey time of 1 kilometre 
with X volume of PCUs is, as before, given by 1/ AKT(X).  At the given zero price 
current level of demand, X0, in the cordon area with average trip length within it, Dist, 
(9) above must be assumed to be greater than the net budgetary benefits from any 
other alternative mode of transport.  The price as the maximum willingness to pay for 
road use in the cordon area by the nig th agents present is determined  as follows:            
0)(
)()( 0 =−− DistXAKT
ny
VOCny ig
h
ig
dα :For marginal nig withat P(( X0)=0 .        (10) 
0)(
)()( 0 >−− DistXAKT
ny
VOCny ig
h
ig
dα : :For intra-marginal nig ,P( X0)=0.    (11)                                                                                                      
                    
Note that equation (10) states that at zero price, P( X0)=0, the marginal X0 th road 
user is one whose pro rata daily and hourly income yields zero net benefit from travel 
and α in (10) is calibrated to satisfy this.   Such a calibration of α, at the existing price 
of zero, can be justified to manifest the revealed preference of marginal road users 
whose net benefit and hence willingness to pay is zero.  Thus, if (10) is negative for 
the given volume X0, then those nig decide not make a trip into the cordon area.  In 
contrast, condition (11) holds for the infra-marginal road user.  Equations (10) and 
(11) relate to nig agents’ true monetary values for work related trips at each traffic 
volume X and this will be  denoted as VX0 (X0). for traffic volume X.  with VX0 (X0) 
=0 and corresponds to all the nig marginal agents in (10) who have the X0th. highest 
value and VX*(X0) > 0 with X*< X0 are the true trip values for infra marginal 
commuters in (11) withwho have the  the X* the highest trip value and there is X0 
total demand.  This yields a B(V(X)) bid schedule.  Graphical presentation of the 
uniform-price sealed bid Dutch auction is given in Figure 1. The empirical analysis on 
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the bid values for equations (10) and (11) and the different bid schedules at different  
traffic volumes will follow in   
Section   4. 
When  X#, the optimaldesired  “‘cap,”’ or any fixed supply of travel slots X* 
less than X0,  is imposed, with  X# < X*< X0, the sealed bid uniform Dutch aAuction 
algorithm  ranks the bids of all X bidders from the highest to the lowest and with  the 
market clearing price, P(X*) is given by the  
X*-highest bid in the bid schedule B(V(X*)) :    
 
  P * = P(X*)  =   0)(
)()(
*
*
* >−− Dist
XAKT
XyVOCXy
h
dα .  (12)
 
 
 
When X#, the desired  “cap” or any fixed supply of travel slots X* less than X0  
is imposed, with  X# < X*< X0, the sealed bid uniform Dutch auction algorithm  ranks 
the bids of all X bidders from the highest to the lowest and the market clearing price, 
P(X*) is given by the X*-highest bid in the bid schedule B(V(X*)) :    
  P * = P(X*)  = 0)(
)()(
*
*
* >−− Dist
XAKT
XyVOCXy
h
dα .  (12)  
The inverse demand function in (12) directly determines (X0 – X*) bidders 
who are willing to pay less than the X* highest bid in the bid schedule function 
B(V(X*)).  In other words, if P(X*) is charged then (X0 – X*) bidders will have 
negative net private benefit from the trip and will be priced out of the market.  As will 
be seen, their socio-economic cross sectional composition can also be identified.  
Hence, the price demand elasticity of the system can be probed for any fixed capacity, 
X# < X*< X0, by the operation of the uniform Dutch auction market clearing price 
rule.     
 
Price 
Quantity  X* 
P* 
  X0 
 
   
 
      
  
Figure.ure 1.: Price dDetermination in uniform Dutch 
auction with fixed supply of X* travel slots and actual 
demand of X0  
X* highest bid on 
the bid schedule 
B(V(X*))  
Bids ranked 
from high 
to low 
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The inverse demand function in (12) directly determines (X0 – X*) bidders 
who are willing to pay less than the X* highest bid in the bid schedule function 
B(V(X*)).  In other words, if P(X*) is charged then (X0 – X*) bidders will have 
negative net private benefit from the trip and will be priced out of the market.  As will 
be seen, their socio-economic cross sectional composition can also be identified.  
Hence, the price demand elasticity of the system can be probed for any fixed capacity, 
X# < X*< X0, by the operation of the uniform Dutch auction market clearing price 
rule.     
 
2.3 Market inverse dDemand fFunction and congestion eExternality cCost: 
heterogeneous VOT s of rRoad uUse 
            As heterogeneity of incomes and the implied value of time of the marginal 
market clearing agent at different volumes of road users,  X, is the main determinant 
of the equilibrium prices generated by the SMPRT Dutch auction algorithm as in 
equation (12), it is important to estimate the congestion charge, E, under this 
assumption and compare it with the P(X) function.  
How does the price P(X*) which reduces demand from X0 to X* when the marginal 
market clearing agents have a different valuation of travel time with yh(X0) < yh(X*) ,  
compare with the congestion charge Ec derived in (7) under the assumption of a 
homogenous value for time ?  In the application of the congestion charge in (7), while 
there is an increase in travel time as congestion increases, what is overlooked  is that 
its monetary value falls as those prepared to travel at high levels of congestion have a 
lower VOT.  Hence, iIn the case of heterogeneous VOT , with the private cost 
function is given , we defineas: 
 
    C(X*, yh(X*))  =    VOC   +  )(
)(
XAKT
Xy h Dist.                 (13) 
Price 
Quantity  X* 
P* 
  X0 
 
   
 
      
  
Figure.ure 1.: Price dDetermination in uniform Dutch 
auction with fixed supply of X* travel slots and actual 
demand of X0  
X* highest bid on 
the bid schedule 
B(V(X*))  
Bids ranked 
from high 
to low 
.ure 1. Price dDetermination in uniform 
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The social cost function, SC(X), function integrates the impact of the marginal driver 
on all  over the ininfra-marginal distribution of pro rata daily income from thedrivers 
starting with thefrom  the highest valuation drivers atstarting at X=0 up to the marginal 
driver, X.    Thus, 
 
                
                SC(X)  =  ∫
X
h dssyXC
0
))(,( = XVOC +  )(XAKT
Dist
∫
X
h dssy
0
)( .  (14) 
 
This implies the marginal social cost, MSC(X) of travel which includes  from 
congestion externalities in the heterogeneous value of time case is given by :  
 
                        
Xs
h
h
h
X
XAKT
yXyXC
X
dssyXC
XMSC /
0
)()(,(
))(,(
)( ε+=
∂
∂
=
∫
Dist .  
                                                        
                              =  C(X*, yh(X*))  + Ec (X*).                                                  (154)    
 
Here,  C(X, yh(X))  is given in  (13) and  
  
X
dssy
y
X
h
h
∫
=
0
)(
         and         )()( XAKT
yXVOT
h
= Dist                  (16)                                                    
are, respectively, the average pro rata hourly annual income of infra-marginal road 
users and  )(XVOT  is the average value of time of the infra-marginal road userss for 
the average journey length. .   
 
             
With the SMPRT determined inverse demand function where the price at any 
X,   X#<X < X0  is set to reduce demand to that point, it can be easily shown that only 
for the social optimum, X*,  will the congestion externality cost E (X*) equal the price 
P(X*) .  The social optimum, X*, is obtained when the marginal social cost, MSC, 
equals the marginal social gross benefit, MGB, from the trip.17  This yields: 
     
MGB(X*) =  α yd(X*)=  C(X*, yh(X*))  +  E (X*)= MSC (X*).        (17)     
 
This implies that at X*, 
 
                  P(X*) =  (α yd(X*) - C(X*, yh(X*)) = E(X*).                                (18)   
 
As the private net benefit of the marginal road user, (α yd(X) - C(X, yh(X)) is 
equal to the price, P(X), what the willingness to pay approach indicates is that, to 
                                                 
17
 Social gross gross benefit is ∫
X
d dssy
0
)(α  or the gross daily income of all the infra marginal 
commuters. 
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choke off demand and to accomplish demand consistent with any fixed “cap” X,  
P(X) determined by the SMPRT simulator, has to be levied.  The advantage of this is 
that the SMPRT price can be applied to achieve any desired fixed “cap”, such as X# 
selected in the next section as one beyond which a reduction in congestion may not be 
required on the grounds of traffic efficiency.   In contrast, the congestion externality 
charge, E(X), is valid only at the social optimal X*.  As identifying the social 
optimum X* is problematic, at other values of X, X>X*, charging the difference 
between the private cost and the social marginal cost will contract demand far more 
than is needed.  It is also clear that willingness to pay determined by the inverse 
demand function P(X) is less than the congestion externality cost for X > X*.   Figure 
2 illustrates these points and it has been calibrated in terms of the actual data obtained 
from the SMPRT simulations done for central Gateshead.  First note that at zero price 
P(X0) =0, the gross benefit or the travel budget of the X0 marginal commuter,  
α yd(X0),  is exactly equal to the private unit cost  C(X0 , yh(X0)).  The social optimum 
X* in Figure 2 is obtained at PCU volume, X*= 12136 where the marginal social cost 
curve intersects with the marginal gross benefit curve.  Here, the price P(X*) = E(X*).  
If the chosen cap is X# with X#  <  X*,  the price P(X#) exceeds the pure congestion 
cost, E(X#) related to MSC at X#, and there is some margin to include environmental 
costs of road use.    
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Figure. 2.: Integration of  willingness to pay and inverse demand function P(X) with 
optimal road user charging with congestion externality costs E(X) at social optimum 
, X* 
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Note here,   εy/x  =  
*
*
)(
)(
*
*
X
X
Xy
Xy
∂
∂
 ,                                                                     (15) 
is the elasticity of the VOT to traffic volume and εs/x is defined as in (3).  The 
elasticity εy/x appropriately captures the way in which VOT changes with the VOT of 
the marginal agent who clears the market. Thus, it is clear from the last term in (14), 
that the pure congestion externality cost when agents are assumed to have 
heterogeneous VOT is lower than the case when a uniform VOT is assumed.    
 
We will now consider the problem of having to evaluate the relationship 
between the SMPRT determined inverse demand function where the price at, say X*,   
X#<X* < X0  is set to reduce demand to that point, and the congestion externality cost 
Ec (X*) is such that P(X*)  equals the marginal social cost relating to the time lost 
with congestion.  This yields: 
     
P(X*) = MSCc (X*) =  C(X*, yh(X*))  +  Ec (X*).                  (16)     
 
As the private net benefit of the marginal road user, (α yd(X*) - C(X*, yh(X*)) 
is equal to the price, P(X*), what is important to note is that with the willingness to 
pay approach, to choke off demand and to accomplish demand consistent with (16), 
the full monetary value of the price has to be charged rather than only the congestion 
externality cost, Ec(X*). 
 
In Figure 2, we note that at zero price P(X0) =0, the gross benefit or the travel 
budget of the X0 marginal commuter, α yd(X0),  is exactly equal to the private unit 
cost   
Willingness to pay: less 
than the mMarginal  
sSocial cCostcongestion 
Fig.ure 2.: Integration of dDemand aAnalysis and oOptimal rRoad uUser cCharging 
wWith eExternality Ccosts. 
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C(X0 , yh(X0)).  For any X >X*, the price P(X) is less than MSC c(X) and it not 
only fails to internalize the public externality costs, it will not  reduce demand 
sufficiently to the point where there is no overuse of resources. If the chosen cap is X# 
with X#  >  X*,  the price P(X#) exceeds the pure congestion cost, Ec related MSCc at 
X#, and has some margin to include environmental costs of road use EE.   This is 
shown as   
P(X#) = MSCc(X#) + EE  or, 
 
                              P(X#) – Cc (X#, yh(X#)) =  Ec(X#)  +  EE(X#) .                      (17)    
 
This is marked in Figure 2. 
 
In general, to determine the relationship between price, marginal social gross 
benefit, MSGB, and the marginal social cost, MSCc , we use the following which is 
the definition of  marginal social revenue as a uniform price and applies at all X:  
MSR= c
PX
MSCMSGBXP
X
XXP
−=−=
∂
∂ )11)(()(
/ε
  .                            (18) 
Here εX/P  is the demand elasticity  εX/P  =  
X
XP
XP
X )(
)(∂
∂
 .                               (19)    
And, the marginal social (gross) benefit, 
                                
MSGB   =  α yd (1 -  εy/X) .                                             (20)      
 
Note, εy/X , the elasticity of pro rata daily income is same as in (15). 
Equation (17) holds at each X, given the determination of the price as the net 
benefit (α yd (X) -  C(X, yh(X)).  With inelastic demand  εX/P <  1, which is a 
reasonable assumption at the levels of demand being considered18, the marginal social 
revenue is negative and falls at the rate at which marginal social cost is greater than 
the marginal social benefit. Equation (17) can be simplified to obtain a direct 
relationship between  between the price or bid submission framework and the 
congestion externality cost Ec: 
 
                               )()()( /
/
XEXyXP cxy
d
PX
+= εα
ε
 .                                         (21) 
   
Thus, equation (21) implies that Ec which is VOT  times its elasticity, is equal 
to price times its elasticity less the travel budget of the marginal commuter who clears 
the market times the budget elasticity.  The more inelastic is demand, all things being 
the same, it results in a higher Ec.  Alternatively, from (21) we see that as demand 
elasticity decreases, the price or willingness to pay falls. Indeed, despite crude 
estimates for the congestion charge from equation (7) that are in vogue, as already 
noted, the Pigouvian tax approach for road user externalities really cannot be 
implemented without making ad hoc assumptions about the demand curve for car use 
and about the optimal level of congestion.  The integration of the latter with demand 
analysis in SMPRT is clearly an advance over the generalized cost approach and will  
be tested out in the ensuing sections. 
                                                 
18
 This is also to be expected in road systems where there are no alternative routes or modalities that are 
close ‘substitutes’. 
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3. How to dDetermine athe “‘cCap”’ oOnfor tThe rRoad nNetwork 
sSystem ? 
 
 
3.1 The traffic micro simulation of congestion 
  
Though the situation of free flow at permissible/legal speeds per hour is often 
used as a bench mark to measure the state of congestion, it is well known that zero 
congestion19  is neither socially optimalot the optimal level of congestion nor one that 
coincides with efficient traffic conditions.  However, to date, there has not been a 
consensus methodology on how to gauge the efficiency of the optimal level of traffic 
congestion in thea road network system.  As explained in the introduction, in the 
“‘cap”’ and trade approach to the control of negative externalities of passenger car 
use, it is important to be able to set the “‘cap”’ in terms of the total biddable travel 
slots that entitle commuters to travel at a minimum average kilometres per hour in a 
given time slice.  Here, we explain how thea  “ ‘cap”’ can be determined by an 
identifiable optimal level of congestion evaluated in terms of physical traffic 
conditions in the relevant cordoned area of road network.   For this, following the 
philosophy of  model vérité , (Markose and Sunder,  (2006), which is well understood 
in the application of traffic micro-simulators, the virtual or digitized physical 
environment of the cordon area of road network system of the cityscape is designed to 
include all relevant features such as traffic lights, topography and extant speed rules. 
A powerful state of the art transport micro simulator  implemented by TORG  derives 
the so called production function ofor congestiontraffic where  total distance travelled 
by cars entering the cordon (the total “‘output”’ ) is recorded when there is 
incremental growth in vehicle volumes,  given given in a standardized units of 
passenger car units. (PCUs, for short).  The increments in PCU volumes are achieved 
by the “‘scaling”’ of demand from baseline demand given by the existing OD (Origin-
Destination) matrix of the peak time (8am-9am) road users in the cordon area.   The 
validation of traffic flow for extant traffic volumes for morning peak time traffic is 
achieved by using a combination of dynamic and static route assignment algorithm.  
The “‘cap”’ for the road network system is identified as the point at which the total 
output of the system measured in total distance travelled falls as volume of vehicles 
increase. This is accompanied with an increase in total travel time for all the vehicles.  
The method of  “‘factoring”’ or scaling corresponds to the notion of probing 
the “‘production technology”’ of traffic when increasing vehicle demand is combined 
with a fixed supply of the road network of the cordon area.  In economic analysis, this 
is a well understood concept for determining the point at which there are decreasing 
returns to scale from a factor of production. Such an analysis is critical for identifying 
an optimal traffic conditions. state of congestion.   Thus, relative to the baseline 
demand taken as factor 1, traffic volumes that demand entry in the time slice are 
scaled up or down at the rate of 10%  from the baseline demand, 16,740 PCU, and 
factors from .1 to about 1.7 are simulated for their traffic induced outputs for the 
cordon area. 20 Table 1 and Figure 3 below give the results for the traffic induced 
                                                 
19
 Free flow speed with zero congestion in practice implies a congestion externality cost in time of 
under a minute. 
20
 This is a computationally intensive method with execution times for factor 1.7 (ie. , 70% more 
demand than existing demand) taking over 40 hours.   
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outputs which include aAverage kKilometeres tTravelled (AKT/PCU per hour), tTotal 
tTravel tTime, tTotal dDistance tTravelled and the travel timemarginal congestion 
externality estimated in minutes. 
 
 
 
3.2 Traffic iInduced oOutput and the optimal level of congestion 
 
We omit here all details of the traffic micro-simulation that was done for the 
congestion “‘hotspot”’ in the city of Gateshead in the nNorth of England 21and report 
only the main results of the analysis. As seen from Table 1 and Figure 3 , factor 13,  
in the peak hour traffic period of 8-9am (marked by a shaded band), some 16,700 
PCUs pass through the congestion hotspot in Gateshead slowing traffic down to about 
4 kmh with the cost in minutes of the congestion externality cost in minutes (column 
7 in Table 1) rising to about 56 minutes.  Any further increases in traffic can tip the 
system into complete gridlock where a 1 one kilometre journey adds a burden of 1.5 
hours in terms of time cost of congestion externality.  Note, ,: the average trip length 
in the cordon area is 1.8 kms.   
 
Our analysis shows that free flow of traffic at the average speed of about 
approximately 33 km/hr and which corresponds to zero or under 1 minute (see, 
Table 1 column 7) of congestion externality costs and, is not socially optimal.  
There are social gains from increasing traffic beyond free flow.  Indeed, the 
target of free flow for all vehicles for all times and all roads corresponds to a 
costly over provision of road space. The decline in total output in terms of total 
distance travelled by all cars which demand entry happens  after the precipitous 
decline of the AKT- curve (see, Figure 3 ) and well beyond speeds associated with 
free flow.  Thus, it is it is only at about factor .7 with PCU volume of 11,718,  that 
the total output of the traffic system given in terms of total distance travelled by 
all PCUs starts to decline. At this point, social benefits from using the cordon 
area falls as nobody by his/her travel can benefit without making everybody else 
worse off.  Indeed, many who could have made it to work on time within the 
hour, before demand increased to over more than 11,718, are now unable to do 
so due to the gridlock.  
 
Social marginal cost in Figure 3, given in minutes, is obtained by adding 
(60/AKT) with Ec in minutes reported in column 7 of Table 1.  In the case of 
factor 1 demand, the social marginal cost of congestion in minutes is 14.59 
minutes plus 56.46 minutes,  which gives about 71 minutes. Further, along all the 
critical aspects of negative externalities from road transport, it was found that at 
this point, at factor 0.7 with PCU volume of 11,718, the growth of total travel 
time and that of vehicular emissions altered from being linear to an exponential 
rate. Thus, it is concludedwe conclude that the road system of the cordon area 
for cCentral Gateshead should be capped at about 11,718  PCUs.  This, 
effectively requires a 30% reduction in the demand.   
 
Table 1 
                                                 
21
 Full details of the TORG analysis can be found at www.foresight.gov.uk.  obtained from the authors. 
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Average speed (AKT), total tjourneyravel time per kilometre (TTT), total distance travelled 
per hour, for different levels of demand. (Current level of demand is highlighted.) 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
[PCU] [km/h] [h/km] [h] [km]  [h] [mins] [mins] 
1674 
(0.1) 33.67 0.030 133.7 4501.1 -0.05 -0.002 
-0.12 - 
3348 
(0.2) 35.38 0.028 243.3 8607.5 -0.01 0.000 
0 0 
5022 
(0.3) 35.55 0.028 346.80 12329.0 0.12 0.003 
0.128 1.8 
6696 
(0.4) 34.17 0.029 492.6 16834.5 0.34 0.010 
0.6 2.34 
8370 
(0.5) 31.23 0.032 671.7 20976.7 1.17 0.038 
2.28 4.2 
10044 
(0.6) 23.91 0.042 956.3 22865.3 1.27 0.053 
3.18 5.7 
11718 
(0.7) 18.85 0.053 1502.5 28324.4 1.80 0.096 
5.76 8.94 
13392 
(0.8) 13.99 0.071 2005 28049.9 2.99 0.214 
12.84 17.1 
15066 
(0.9) 8.76 0.114 3091.43 27080.9 4.78 0.545 
32.7 39.54 
16740 
(1) 4.11 0.243 6265.0 26112.6 3.87 0.941 56.46 
71.04 
18414 
(1.1) 2.51 0.398 8081.27 20284.0 3.89 1.55 
92.89 116.77 
20088 
(1.2) 1.97 0.495 9727.8 19234.0 3.80 1.72 
103.41 133.11 
21762 
(1.3) 1.40 0.71 11074.9 15530.2 2.29 1.63 
97.63 140.23 
23436 
(1.4) 1.15 0.495 13209.42 15229.9 - - 
  
                                                 
22
 The traffic induced outputs from the TORG simulation for each of the ODdemand factors should in 
principle be the average of a number of trial runs.  This is because due to the stochastic nature of 
VISSIM route assignment simulations, while a single set of simulations have produced clear trends, 
there are some fluctuations around this.  However, given the computational intensive nature of 
completing a single set of runs for OD demand factors .1 to 1.7, we have had to “‘smooth”’ the data 
points in some cases to follow the trend rather than average across several runs.   Thus, for example, 
the AKT -curve produced from a single set of runs for factors .1 to .1.7, given in the TORG Appendix, 
shows some fluctuations.   
23
 ET or time congestion externality cost in hours
AKT
XS /ε in column 7 is  obtained by multiplying column 
3 2 figures with withthose in column 6. 
24
 This is obtained by multiplying figures in  column 67 by 60 to get the  time cost of congestion 
externality cost in minutes.  Social marginal cost in Figure 3 given in minutes is obtained by adding  
(60/AKT) to Ec in minutes reported in column 7 of Table 1.   
25
 Marginal total travel time cost in column 9 of Table 1 and in Figure 3 is given in minutes and is 
obtained by adding  60/AKT to time congestion externality cost in minutes reported in column 8 of 
Table 1.   
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Our analysis shows that free flow of traffic at the average speed of about 35 
km/hr corresponds to zero or under 1 minute (see, Table 1 column 8) of time 
congestion externality costs and is not optimal in terms of the production function for 
traffic.  There are ‘productivity’ gains from increasing traffic beyond free flow. 
Indeed, the target of free flow for all vehicles for all times and all roads corresponds 
to a costly over provision of road space. The decline in total output in terms of total 
distance travelled by all cars which demand entry happens  after the precipitous 
decline of the AKT curve (see Figure 3 ) and well beyond speeds associated with free 
flow. Thus, it is it is only at about factor .7 with PCU volume of 11,718 that the total 
output of the traffic system given in terms of total distance travelled by all PCUs 
starts to decline. At this point, benefits from using the cordon area falls as nobody by 
his/her travel can benefit without making everybody else worse off.  Indeed, many 
who could have made it to work on time within the hour, before demand increased to 
more than 11,718, are now unable to do so due to the gridlock.  
Marginal total journey time cost in Figure 3, given in minutes, is obtained by 
adding average time of the journey in minutes, viz.60/AKT, with the time cost of 
congestion externality in minutes reported in column 8 of Table 1.  Thus, in the case 
of factor 1 demand of 16740 PCUs, the marginal total cost of a kilometre trip is given 
by adding 14.59 minutes to 56.46 minutes, which gives about 71 minutes (see column 
9 in Table 1). Further, along all the critical aspects of negative externalities from road 
transport, it was found that at this point, at factor 0.7 with PCU volume of 11,718, the 
growth of total travel time and that of vehicular emissions altered from being linear to 
an exponential rate. Thus, we conclude that for the cordon area for central Gateshead, 
a “cap” of about 11,718  PCUs can be recommended.  This effectively requires a 30% 
reduction in demand.    
Table 1: Average speed (AKT), Total Travel Time (TTT), Total Distance Travelled 
per hour, for different levels of demand. (Current level of demand is highlighted.) 
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Figure. 33:. Congestion Externalities/Tragedy of Commons Problem   in Distance/hour 
and Journey Time/km 
The production function for traffic (total distance traveled in kms/h by all PCUs) 
AKT/hr-curve for average speed 
Marginal total social cost  traveljourney time minus marginal privateaverage  cost 
traveljourney  time = congestion externality in travel time 
 
 
 
 
4. The bBid sSubmission pProcess and sSmart mMarket (SMPRT) 
aAlgorithm 
 
4.1 Empirical aAnalysis of the bBid sSubmission pProcess  
 
 The production function for Traffic (Total Distance Traveled kms ) 
  AKT/hr- Curve For Average Speed ; Marginal  Social Cost  Travel Time minus 
Marginal Private Cost Travel  Time = Congestion Externality in Travel Time 
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In order to understand how road users will bid for slots to travel in a given 
time slice, and also to establish the efficacy of the SMPRT algorithm as a means of 
determining the  road user charge to achieve the desired level of congestion at the 
“‘cap”’ for the cordon area, an extensive analysis of the socio-economic and income 
distribution characteristics of the commuters that who traverse the cordon area of 
Gateshead was done.  
This is because, as discussed earlier, equations (10) and (11) which determine 
whether road users travel or not through the cordon area during morning peak hour 
and their maximum willingness to pay is based on their pro rata daily and hourly 
income.   Note, the value of travel time VOT is imputed from the willingness to pay 
function  for of the marginal commuter whose bid clears the market  for a given fixed 
supply of travel slots.     
 
On superimposing the origin-destination statistics for the region with those for 
the cordon area, we are able to cross-correlate the peak time road users that who 
traverse the cordoned area with the socio-economic classes of commuters in the 
region given in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 
Percentages of commuters in each socio-economic group 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Percentages of commuters in each socio-economic group 
 
The range of incomes in each of these groups yields Table 3. 
 
On superimposing the origin-destination statistics for the region with those for 
the cordon area, we are able to cross-correlate the peak time road users who traverse 
the cordoned area with the socio-economic classes of commuters in the region given 
in Table 2.  
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Table 3 
Income range of each socio-economic group in the north of England 
 
 
 
Table 3: Income range of each socio-economic group in the North of England 
 
Based on the multi-modal study of commuters in the region (Ove Arup 
Report, 2002),  we know that 78% of commuters are car drivers, and that the 
distribution of drivers is skewed towards the high earners. We do not have car 
ownership data for the socio-economic classes.  Therefore, we choose a threshold 
under which we assume an individual could not afford to drive a car. A threshold of 
£10,500 when applied to the disaggregated income data in Table 3 gave us the 
required outcome that 78% of commuters are car drivers. Further, on assuming a the 
total population of car users to be 16,740, we obtain the income distribution given in 
Figure 4 .     
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Figureg.ure 44:.: Income distribution of car drivers (mMean annual income is £ 
21,990.39)  
 
 
4.2 Empirical bBid sSchedules of dDifferent sSocio-eEconomic gGroups of rRoad 
uUsers 
 
Using the income data for each of the 16740 road users and with the 
standardized Vehicle Operating Costs (VOC) calculated to be 47.48 pence 26 for the 
cordon average trip length of 1.8 kms,  equations (10) and (11) in Section 2.4 were 
used to determine their bids.  Further, the data on AKT/hr for the PCU volume from 
Table 1 is used.  Note, also α,  the proportion of pro rata  daily income which 
determines the travel budget, is obtained determined to be .0666.6 by calibrating 
equation (10) such so that the market clearing bid at current demand of 16,740 equals 
zero.  The following Table 4 gives the bid schedules for the average agent in each of 
the professional categories where a bid has to be made for a travel slot to travel at a 
speed given in top row of Table 4.   
The bid schedules given in Table 4 are plotted in Figure 5 with a colour code 
for each group. With AKT/hr on the vertical axis and £ value of bids on the horizontal 
axis, the representative agent from the higher income group has a bid schedule further 
to the left (viz. higher £ value) than those in lower income groups.  Note from 
equations (10) and (11) in traffic conditions of close to free flow speeds, size of bids 
is primarily determined by the size of commuters’ daily travel budget, α yd, as the 
time cost of congestion  1/AKT is small. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Bid schedules at different volume of PCUs for the average/representative agent in 
each group *( Pro Rata daily average income is given in brackets)  
 
 
AKT/hr 18.85 13.95 8.76 4.11 
PCU/hr 11718 13392 15066 16740 
Managers 
 (£115.48)* 
Bid £3.77 £3.44 £2.67 £0.35 
Professionals 
(£99.41)* 
Bid £2.97 £2.71 £2.08 £0.19 
Semi-routine 
(£85)* 
Bid £2.44 £2.22 £1.69 £0.09 
Administrative 
 (£67.90)* 
Bid £1.86 £1.68 £1.25 £0.00 
Personal service 
 (£60.50)* 
Bid £1.59 £1.43 £1.06 £0.00 
Sales £1.65 £1.48 £1.10 £0.00 
                                                 
26
 This based on recent figures given in Shaffer and Santos (2005).  
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 (£61.14)* 
Bid 
Routine 
 (£99.41)* 
Bid £1.75 £1.58 £1.17 £0.00 
 
For the higher income group (managers) with greater opportunity cost of time, 
the willingness to pay at higher speeds is relatively greater than at lower speeds. For 
example, the average range of bids for the managerial group goes from close to £4 to 
as little as 35 pence.   
 
 
Table 4: Bid schedules at different volume of PCUs for the 
average/representative agent in each group *( Pro Rata daily average income is given 
in brackets)   
 
The bid schedules given in Table 4 are plotted in Figure 5 with a colour code 
for each group.  With AKT/hr on the vertical axis and £ value of bids on the 
horizontal axis, the representative agent from the higher income group has a bid 
schedule further to the left (viz. higher £ value) than those in lower income groups.  
Note from equations (10) and (11) in traffic conditions of close to free flow speeds, 
size of bids are is primarily determined by the size of commuter’s’ daily travel 
budget, α yd, as the time cost of congestion  1/AKT is small.  
 
 
Figure.ure 5:.: Bid Schedule of representative agent from each socio-economic class 
 
In contrast, those whose value of time is low (lower income groups) the bids 
remain more constant (viz., vertical in Figure 5) starting at relatively low values of 
about £1.56 for those in personal services, for example. This is because their VOT 
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with pro rata hourly wage, being relatively small, they are less responsive to 
increasing time costs of congestion, Table 5.  
 
For the higher income group (mManagers) with greater opportunity cost of 
time, the willingness to pay at higher speeds is relatively greater than at lower speeds. 
For example, the average range of bids for the managerial group goes from close to £4 
to as little as 35 pence.  In contrast, those whose value of time is low (lower income 
groups) the bids remain more constant (viz., vertical in Figure 5) starting at relatively 
low values of about £1.56 for those in pPersonal sServices, for example.  This is 
because their VOT with pro rata hourly wage, being relatively small, they are less 
responsive to increasing time costs of congestion, Table 5.  
 
 
Table 5 
Sensitivities for bid values to change in journey time for representative agent in each group 
(sensitivity calculated as (∆ Bid/ ∆(1/AKT)) 
  
 
PCU 11718 13392 15066 16740 
Managers 5.0 2.7 0.8 0.1 
Professionals 4.9 2.7 0.7 0.1 
Semi-routine 4.9 2.7 0.7 0.1 
Administrative 4.7 2.6 0.7 0.0 
Personal service 4.6 2.5 0.6 0.0 
Sales 4.5 2.4 0.6 0.0 
Routine 4.5 2.5 0.6 0.0 
 
Table 5: Sensitivities for Bid Values To Change In Journey Time For Representative 
Agent in Each Group (Sensitivity calculated as (∆ Bid/ ∆(1/AKT)) 
          
    
 
5. Description of SMPRT sSimulator and rResults 
 
5.1 SMPRT sSimulator iInputs: AKT-curve and bBid sSubmission 
 
The workings of the SMPRT simulator is displayed in a 4-qQuadrant pPlot 
referred to as Panel A , Panel B, Panel C and Panel D.  Panels A and B contain the 
two main inputs to the Dutch aAuction pricing algorithm while Panels C and D give 
the main results.      
 
Panel B displays the so called AKT-curve obtained from the TORG traffic simulator 
for the cordon area which gives the relationship between the speed and the volume of 
PCU.   Below, the cursor is set at the AKT/hr of 18.85 km/h at the “‘cap”’ for the 
system iidentified earlier in Section 3.2 at 11,71818.  
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Figure.ure 6:.: AKT/hr function with the cursor at cap of 11,71208 PCU yield an average 
speed (AKT/hr) of 18.85 Km/h). 
 
Panel A of the SMPRT simulator, in Figure 7  below, gives all 16,740  bid 
schedules as a function of AKT/hr given on the vertical axis. Note that the bids are 
colour coded to indicate the professional group of the bidder. (Typically, a horizontal 
blue line cursor in Panel A marks the cross section of bids for the AKT/hr at the 
chosen level of PCU.)  At close to free flow AKT/hr of 24 km/h, bids start at about 
£13 while at the current road use demand, by construction bids are zero.  Figure 7  
shows that at about 8 km/h, as the system gets into a state of gridlock,– bids from 
across the board begin to converge to zero. 
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Figure.ure 7:.: All 16,740  bid schedules with of AKT/hr given on the vertical axis. 
 
 
5.2 SMPRT sSimulation oOutputs: mMarket pPrice and mMarket dDemand cCurve  
 
As explained in Figure 1 in Section 2.4, the SMPRT Dutch aAuction protocol 
ranks bids from highest to lowest, to obtain the market demand/ functionaggregate bid 
schedule for a particular AKT/hr associated with the PCU level. This is plotted in 
Panel C of the SMPRT Simulator and shown in Figure 8.  What is important to note is 
that if all agents have a constant bid schedule for all speeds with relevant PCU 
volumes (such is the case when agents bid a constant proportion of their daily pro 
rata income and set their sensitivity to travel time costs from congestion to zero,, ; 
(see, Appendix 1 )) then the market demand/ function aggregate bid schedule is the 
same for all  levels of PCU.      However, using the willingness to pay function in 
equations (10) and (11), there is a different market demand/aggregate bid curve for 
each PCU volume with its corresponding AKT/hr.  In  Figure 8, we show 4 four 
market demand/aggregate bid schedules curves, one for each PCU level. The top 
curve corresponds to the optimal X# cap of 11,718 PCU27, while the lowest curve 
corresponds to the demand/aggregate bid  functfunction at current levels of traffic, 
i.e., PCU of 16,740. Note,, how the clearing price at current market demand is zero. 
 
 
Figure.ure 8:.: Inverse pPricedemand fFunction P(X) : cCurve cConnecting the SMPRT 
determined market clearing bids given as dots for the respective supply of PCU slots.  
 
The SMPRT algorithm determines the clearing price as the X* th highest bid 
givenfor by the fixed X* supply of PCU slots which is less than the current demand of 
X0.  The clearing price (the green curve with dots in Figure 8) needs to be read off 
                                                 
27
 The SMPRT algorithm rounds off the optimal X# ‘cap’ value to be 11,720 rather than 11,718.  
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from the appropriate market demand/aggregate bid  curve. Thus, the market clearing 
price of £2.90 at the “‘cap”’ of 11, 720 PCU is indicated by the vertical a blue cursor 
in Panel C.  The green curve connecting the market clearing price at the different 
chosen levels of fixed supply of travel slots given in Panel C is the inverse 
equilibrium market demand function P(X) defined in equation (12) of Section 2.4. 
Note R-cap of 1.43 referred to in Figure 8 definesrepresents the  relative excess 
demand of 5020 and is given by at ratio of the current demand relative toand the 
optimal physical “cap” of 11, 720. 
 
5.3  SMPRT pPrices, and dDemand and vValue of tTime iIncome eElasticities  
          
The SMPRT algorithm is designed so that the uniform application of the market 
clearing price P(X*) to all bidders will reduce excess demand from X0 to X*. Thus, 
starting at zero clearing price at current demand, as supply of travels slots are reduced, 
the price increases along the inverse equilibrium demand function P(X*)  till the price 
of £2.90 at the “‘cap”’ of 11,720 is obtained.  At this point, AKT/hr has increased to 
18.85kms from 4.11kms. These SMPRT prices are reported in Table 6 along with the 
demand elasticities,  PX /ε , the speed elasticities , XS /ε , and value of time/income 
XY /ε   with the former defined in a similar way as inrespectively defined in equations 
(19),  (3) and (15).   These are evaluated at points  X# < X*< X0  with demand and 
prices modelled as changing incrementally.  Thus, εX/P = 0.71 will be taken to be the 
demand elasticity at the optimal cap  X# = 11718 when demand is reduced from 
12555.  .  If demand is reduced to the other points X* from X0 at zero price, the 
relevant data is given in brackets in Table 6 .  As seen in Table 6, the demand 
elasticities, PX /ε , are inelastic and less than one in the relevant range of demand and 
the elasticity ranges from 0.11 to 0.71 at the cap volume X# = 11718.   
 
Table 6  
 Prices and elasticities of SMPRT model for different PCU volumes. (Note: PX /ε and  
XY /ε  takes negative values.) The asterisk values have been interpolated. 
 
 
PCU 
X AKT(X) 
Clearing 
pPrice 
SMPRT 
model 
Change in 
dDemand
% 
∆X% 
Change 
in price 
∆P% 
Change 
in 
AKT(X) 
∆AKT% 
Elasticity 
oOf AKT 
to PCU 
XS /ε  
Elasticity 
oOf 
dDeman
d to 
pPrice 
PX /ε
* 
11718 18.85 £2.90 0.071 (0.43) 
0.9510 
(1.00) 
0.128 
(0.78) 
1.81 
(1.82) 
0.751 
(0.43) 
12555
* 
16.42 £2.61* 0.06* (0.34) 
0.11* 
(1.00) 
0.148* 
(0.75) 
2.40* 
(2.21) 
0.57* 
(0.34) 
13392 13.99 £2.32 0.13 (0.25) 
0.34 
(1.00) 
0.71 
(0.71) 
2.99 
(2.82) 
0.36 
(0.25) 
15066 8.76 £1.52 0.11 (0.11) 
1.00 
(1.00) 
0.53 
(0.53) 
4.77 
(4.77) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
16740 4.11 £0.00 - - - - - 
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Table 6:  Prices and Elasticities of SMPRT Model For Different PCU Volumes 
(Note: PX /ε and  XY /ε  take negative values.) The asterisk values have been 
interpolated. 
                                      
As seen in Table 6, the demand elasticities, PX /ε , are inelastic and less than one in 
the relevant range of demand and the elasticity ranges from 0.11 to 0.71 at the cap 
volume X# = 11718.  Table 6 gives the  pro rata  hourly income of the different 
marginal bidders who clear the market at the respective PCU volumes. At low speeds, 
increases in demand lowers the pro rata income of the marginal bidder more than at 
higher speeds.  Table 7 reports the pro rata daily and hourly income of the different 
marginal bidders who clear the market at the respective PCU volumes.  This then 
determines how the value of time, VOT, for these marginal drivers as increases with 
travel time increases with a reduction in speed caused by congestion.  This is to be 
compared with VOT , viz. the average value of time of the infra marginal driver with 
hy defined in equation (16).   Note VOT   Ifor all the infra marginal users is greater 
than, VOT, which applies to the marginal user.  t  also shows how the clearing price is 
simply the difference between the private cost given in column 5 and the gross travel 
budgets of the marginal clearing agent.    
 
Table 7  
:Value of time (VOT) of marginal user, private unit cost of travel and VOT , Average value 
of time of infra marginal users 
 and gross benefit/travel budget. 
 
 
PCU 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
yYd 
Daily Iincome of 
Mmarginal 
 user 
 
2 
 
yh 
Hourly income of 
marginal  user 
 
 
 
3   
 
VOT 
Yyh/AKT(X) 
x Dist 
 
 
 
4 
dy  
Average 
daily 
income 
infra 
marginal  
user 
 
 
5 
 
hy  
Average 
hourly income 
infra marginal  
users 
 
Eq (16) 
 
 
6 
VOT  
aAverage of 
infra marginal 
user 
hy /AKT(X) 
x Dist 
Eq (16) 
 
        7 
Gross 
bBenefit 
yd 
11718 £62.44 £7.80 £0.75 
 
£103.09 
 
£12.87 £1.23£4.12 
12555* £59.19* £7.39 £0.83* 
 
£100.14 
 
£12.51 £1.37£3.91* 
13392 £55.95 £6.99 £0.90 
 
£97.84 
 
£12.23 £1.57£3.69 
15066 £49.63 £6.20 £1.27 
 
£93.22 
 
£11.65 £2.39£3.28 
16740 £42.00 £5.25 £2.30 
 
£88.47 
 
£11.05 £4.84£2.77 
 
Table 7: Value of Time (VOT), Private Cost and Gross Benefit/Travel Budget 
(Note : The * values are interpolated; VOC is £0. 47; the pro rata hourly income is 
obtained by dividing the daily rate by 8 working hours).   
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In Table 8, we first note that the SMPRT willingness to pay approach for the 
given volume of traffic and speed yields the market clearing price as the marginal 
gross benefit net the private cost of travel of the marginal user. Thus, the SMPRT 
prices are obtained from the data in columns 3 and 4 of Table 8.   The row that has 
been highlighted shows that social optimum volume of drivers, see X* = 12136.  Here 
the MSC = MGB at approximately £4.00.  As per equation (18), we have the SMPRT  
P(X*) is equal to the congestion externality cost of £ 2.76.  how the market clearing 
price relates to the marginal social cost from congestion.  At the cap, X#= 11,718, we 
see that the price of £2.90 signals the willingness to pay by the marginal 11,718  
highest net value commuters.  At this cap level, the price of £2.90 is greater than the 
congestion externality cost of £2.24 given in column 7 of  Table 8 marginal social 
cost.   However, at approximately , X= 12,555   Indeed, the price equals marginal 
social cost at about £2.61.  However, as noted before, at a price of £2.61, there is no 
scope for the inclusion of costs from environmental externalities of about £0.66 (ie. 
£2.90- £2.24) and maintain demand at 11,718.   Note, .                  This is also shown 
in Figure 12 has been calibrated in in terms of the data given in Table 8.  The power 
of the method lies in the fact that the inverse demand function in Figure 2 has been 
obtained from the equilibrium market clearing price function (the dotted curve) 
obtained from the SMPRT simulator shown in Figure 8. Ec and EE with the latter 
being £0.88, 
 
 
Table 9 
Table 8 
 Social optimum and SMPRT Price compared to marginal social cost and GCF congestion 
charge with homogeneous VOT (GCF) and with heterogeneous VOT . 
 
 
 
 
PCU 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
Clearing 
pPrice 
SMPRT 
mModel 
 
 
2 
 
Marginal  
Ssocial 
gGross  
bBenefit 
 
   αYyD
d[ 1-
XY /ε ]   
 
 
 
3 
 
Private cost: 
VOC+VOT 
 
(VOT given in 
Table 7 
column 4 plus 
VOC= £0.47) 
                
            4 
 
Marginal  
sSocial cCost 
hHeterogeneous  
cCase 
MSCc= 
pPrivate cCost + 
E(X) 
 VOT( XS /ε -
 
XY /ε ] 
Eq.uation: (1145) 
5 
 
Congestion 
cCharge 
gGeneralized  
cCost  
function 
aApproach 
(GCF) 
 
 
 
6 
 
CSMPRT  
cCongestion 
cCharge  
hHeterogeneous 
cCase 
Ec(X) == 
VOTVOT  
( XS /ε  
Eq. (16) 
           7- XY /ε ] 
 
 
11718 
 
£2.90 
 
 
£4.12£1.
07 
(0.97) 
£1.22 
 
£3.462.83£2.02 
(£2.01) 
 
£2.04 
 
£2.24£0.80 
(£0.79) 
 
12136* 
 
£2.76* 
 
£4.00* £1.26* 
 
£4.02* 
 
£2.67* 
 
£2.76* 
 
12555* 
 
£2.61* 
 
£3.91£0.
70 
(£0.49) 
£1.30 
 
£4.584.08£2.63
* 
(£2.51) 
 
£3.30 
 
£3.28£1.33 
(£1.22) 
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13392 
 
£2.32 
 
£3.69£0.
36 
(£0.01) 
£1.37 
 
£6.065.49£3.25 
(£3.02) 
 
£4.56 
 
£4.69£1.88 
(£1.64) 
 
15066 
£1.52 £3.28£-
1.26 
(£-1.26) £1.75 
 
£13.1512.07£6.
07 
(£6.07) 
 
£11.62 
 
£11.40£4.32 
(4.32) 
 
16740 
 
£0.00 
 
£2.77 £2.77 
- - - 
Note: The asterisk * denotes that this row has been interpolated. 
Table 9 : SMPRT Price Compared to Marginal Social Cost  and GCF Congestion 
Charge 
 
Finally, we will compare the estimates for congestion externality cost using 
equations (145) and (16)  in the heterogeneous VOT case and variants in the literature 
based on the gGeneralized cCost fFunction (GCF) approach.   We will shall assume 
the homogeneous value of time VOT for road users in the North East is 2/3 of the 
VOT of £17.76/hr, recently used for London and the South East (Santos and Shaffer, 
2005).  Using equation (7) multiplied by the average trip length of 1.8 kms, this yields 
yields the figures given in column 6 in Table 8.28  Absenting knowledge of price 
demand elasticities and the inverse demand function for the traffic system, which is 
not integral to the GCF approach, it is not clear which volume of X is the appropriate 
one at which the congestion charge will secure demand approximately consistent with 
the GCF charge. £2.04 given in the second last column in Table 9.29  It is clear that, 
gGiven the demand elasticities estimated here, the GCF congestion charge will be a 
blunt instrument being either too high at £3.30 or too low at £2.04 to fine tune 
demand to either 11,718 or 12,555.    In the last column of Table 9, we see that the 
congestion  externality cost, with the value of travel time determined by that for the 
clearing agent, is substantially smaller than in the GCF case.    At the social optimum 
of  X* = 12136, the GCF externality cost at £2.67 is about 10 pence less than the one 
calculated by the SMPRT model. 
 
 
5.4 Winners and lLosers aAcross sSocio-eEconomic gGroups fFrom rRoad uUser 
cCharging    
                     
From the bid submission process and the winner determination algorithm of 
SMPRT, Panel (i) in Figure 9 below reports the percentage of total commuters that 
belong to the different socio-economic groups.   The largest group of commuters 
belongs to the semi-routine group (36%) followed by the managerial group (21%), 
professionals (17%) , administrators (14%), sales and routine at 7% each and finally, 
                                                 
28
 For example £2.04 at PCU volume of  11718 we have: 
.04.2£8.181.1
85.18
82.11£
)(
76.17£
3
2
)Charge(X Congestion GCF |# === xDistXAKT XSε  
29
 For example £2.04 at PCU volume of  
.04.2£8.181.1
85.18
82.11£
)(
76.17£
3
2
)Charge(X Congestion GCF |# === xDistXAKT XSε  
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the personal services at 2%.  In Panels ii, iii and iv of Figure 13, the supply of slots 
has been reduced by 10%, 20% and 30%, respectively, from existing demand.   How 
the rise in the market clearing price affects the different socio-economic groups is 
given as the new percentage of commuters from each socio-economic group relative 
to the original demand. Thus, using Table 109, with a reduced supply of travel slots at 
15,066, total numbers of commuters belonging to the semi-routine groups has fallen 
to 5,590 and this constitutes about 34% of the original number of road users.   Thus, 
distributional impact of road pricing can be assessed in an integrated way using the 
bid based approach to road pricing.  
 
Table 109 
Absolute numbers of “winners” in socio-economic groups 
given prices at each PCU volume 
 
PCU 11718 13392 15066 16740 
Managers 3050 3280 3380 3500 
Professionals 1950 2030 2120 2160 
Semi-routine 4430 5000 5590 5990 
Administrative 1060 1490 1920 2400 
Personal service 130 150 230 300 
Sales 530 750 980 1200 
Routine 560 680 840 1150 
 
Table 10: Absolute Numbers of ‘Winners’ In Socio-Economic Groups 
Given Prices at Each PCU Volume 
 
 
 
(i)  (ii) 
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 (iii) 
 
  
(iv) 
Figure.ure 9:.: Winners and lLosers across sSocio-eEconomic gGroups..  
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6. Concluding rRemarks and fFuture wWork 
 
The  SMPRT project has delivered an integrated, agent based methodology 
based on the “‘cap”’ and trade approach for the pricing and control of negative 
externalities to determine peak time congestion charging in a cordon area of a road 
network system.  The demonstrated principles and steps in its implementation can be 
followed in any road transport congestion pricing problem where congestion hot-spots 
in the road system have been identified.  The methodology for determining the 
“‘cap”’ in a cordon area of the road network, though computationally intensive and 
based on a micro- simulative transport model of fine granularity, is within the scope 
of state of the art transport micro simulators.  The “‘cap”’ is the point at which the so 
called total output function  of road travel, which is total distance travelled in the 
cordon area by all cars  for the fixed time slice, falls with incremental increases in 
volumes of traffic.  This is a point at which the traffic efficiency and otal social 
welfare gains from travel begin to diminish rapidly.  The electronic Dutch Auction 
auction heterogeneous bid submission process, based on the actual distribution of 
income and the socio-economic characteristics of road users who traverse the cordon 
area,  has obvious advantages over extant generalized cost function methods for 
estimating congestion charging.  These include the capacity to derive the inverse 
demand function for the traffic system and also better capabilities of for probing the 
system for demand elasticities, especially for the different socio-economic classes.   
Further, our approach clearly indicates that an arbitrary increase in road user charging 
beyond the “‘cap”’ implied price only contributes to the coffers of the monopoly 
provider and cannot be justified in terms of welfare gains in traffic efficiencyto 
society.  The transparency of the SMPRT algorithm should provide a bulwark against 
over-pricing. 
 The simulation of the willingness to pay, based on the pro rata daily income 
distribution across the heterogeneous groups of road users and which is calibrated to 
satisfy the revealed preference in the current situation of zero price and hence zero 
willingness to pay, provides an important source of data and an analysisis of  the 
value of travel time.  This approach can be contrasted with the econometric based 
analysis of revealed preference of road users in the dynamic pricing on the designated 
eExpress lanes and of the stated preferences arising from hypothetical responses to 
questionnaires on road pricing (Small et. al. (2005), and Brownstone et. al. (2002)).   
The SMPRT bid only pricing, like the London congestion charge, can be 
regressive.   The SMPRT algorithm and its agent based approach can identify who is 
being priced out and can help in targeting better public transport or other welfare 
measures.   In a double sided auction with fully tradable permits, those who sell the 
permits receive the incomes and hence, avoidance of road use is not only less 
regressive but also provides direct economic incentives to road users and to others 
indirectly to economize on road use and use the money to use other transport 
modalities.   The design of a system of fully tradable road user permits, however, is 
more complex in terms of its property rights allocations, and the full study of its 
socio-economic consequences are is beyond the scope of this project.  
Finally, in conclusion it is important to report the robustness tests for the 
efficacy of the proposed auction protocol to deliverin delivering the prices and 
revenues obtained under the assumption that agents bid true values.  These tests have 
been done and it has been found that the large numbers of bidders alone guarantees 
thatwith excess demands of 20% or more is are sufficient for the marginal bids to 
reflect true value.   A fuller discussion of this can found in Markose et. al. (2006). 
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Appendix A1:  
 
 
Here we show the nature of the bid schedules if agents used a constant bid function in 
terms of their a his/her fixed gross budget αyd(nig ) rather than the net benefit rule in 
equations (10) and (11)  where the increase in travel time costs are deducted.  This 
implies inelastic bids given in Figure A1 and that agents do not have a different bid 
schedule for each PCU level and the corresponding speed, AKT.  
         
 
Figure Fig.ure A1:. : Constant bBid fFunctions based solely on a fixed budget αyd(nig) .  
 
The SMPRT algorithm that determines bids from highest to lowest obtains a 
single market demand function  and the fixed supply determines the market clearing 
price at each X as shown below.  For the same income distribution, the cap price at 
X= 11,720 is £4.07 as compared to £2.90 in the case of a congestion sensitive bid 
function.  
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